The paper examines the impact of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism for over 110 countries during 1995-2012. Panel country fixed-effects techniques are utilized to examine the relationship after controlling for other factors that contribute to inbound tourism.
Introduction
Tourism is a large and rapidly growing sector in the world economy. In 2014 international tourist arrivals were recorded at 1138 million (UNWTO 2015) . The UNWTO goes on to note that this 2014 figure represents the fifth year of consecutive strong growth. Taleb Rifai, UNWTO Secretary-General, argues that the tourism sector has strongly contributed to international economic recovery as well as providing millions of jobs throughout the world 4 country's tourism industry more competitive which, in turn, brings in more tourists (see Das and Dirienzo 2009 ).
We also argue that whether a country has strong political freedom or strong economic freedom -either way it will do better in attracting tourists than if it had neither of these attributes. While, from a liberal view point, it is obviously desirable to have both political and economic freedom these objectives cannot be achieved instantly even by altruistic policy makers. If, for example, economic reforms can be achieved faster than political reforms, then we argue that these economic reforms by themselves will have a tendency to increase number of international tourists. For instance, think of the growth of tourism following the economic reforms in China (see Lew 2001 ).
This study analyses the impact of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism by using panel data techniques for over 110 countries for the period 1995-2012. The panel fixed effects technique is utilized in handling the potential endogeneity owing to the unobserved country fixed effects. We also use the moderation (interaction) effect technique to estimate the impacts of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism. 1 Hence, one of the objectives of this paper is to develop an inbound tourism model that can capture the impacts of interaction between these two freedom variables on tourism businesses. The model can then generate more accurate estimations of tourism demand for the purposes of forecasting and planning effective strategies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines a theoretical perspective followed by a data description, an empirical strategy and the results. In the final section the conclusions are presented.
Theoretical Background

5
Apart from the occasional hermit kingdom, governments actively promote their tourism sector. This support can be rationalized using the standard market failure paradigm. That is, tourist developments and promotions have positive externalities. Government support can also be understood in terms of political economy considerations. The tourism sector typically has the potential to employ large numbers of semi-skilled workers, often outside the main metropolitan areas. Hence the factors that cause tourists to choose between destinations are clearly of interest to policy makers, and, this interest can be clearly understood in terms of mainstream economic theory.
At first glance it might seem obvious that increases in all freedoms (whether political or economic) would make a destination more attractive to tourists. However, it needs to be remembered that tourists are not immigrants. A tourist might enjoy the benefits of living in a liberal democracy, but be happy to visit a 'tourist friendly' dictatorship. 2 Alternatively, a tourist might make a moral choice to avoid visiting a reviled dictatorship such as Myanmar prior to the recent reforms. The apparent dichotomy between the amoral and moral tourist is muddied by the risk-conscious tourist who believes that dictatorships and illiberal democracies 3 are inherently riskier countries to visit. Putting aside the fear of an unexpected explosion in political violence, a tourist might fear falling foul of an arbitrary, corrupt and ineffectual law enforcement/judicial system. Even where such a system takes a tolerant view of misbehaving tourists (drunken and rowdy behaviour) there is the concern that some dispute with an influential local might result in a harsh penalty. In addition, a police 'crack down' may result in tourists being penalized for trivial offences 4 or for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. We regard tourists being concerned about 'getting into trouble' with an illiberal regime as an issue associated with a lack of civil liberties rather than a lack of political rights. The basic political rights such as the right to vote and the right to form political parties exist in both liberal and illiberal democracies. However, with illiberal 6 democracies there is an inherent lack of civil liberties because there are not the institutions (such as a free press and independent judiciary) to defend such liberties. On the other hand, lack of economic freedom has the potential to negatively impact on the 'tourist experience' since economic freedom allows entrepreneurs to provide a broad range of tourist services.
When competition is allowed to work there is a strong incentive not to provide poor and disinterested service. So our contention is that civil liberties and economic freedom will attract tourists, but political rights (the distinguishing factor between an authoritarian regime and an illiberal democracy) will typically not have a significant effect upon tourist demand (with countries like Myanmar being something of an exception). We further contend that whether a country has strong civil liberties or strong economic freedom -either way it will do better at attracting tourists than if it had neither of these attributes.
Commenting further on the role of economic freedom we note that Barro and Sala-iMartin 2004 , Knack and Keefer 1995 , Mauro 1995 , Dawson 1998 , and Easton and Walker 1997 argue that an economically free nation produces a more competitive business environment by providing an established and stable legal and monetary system, efficient labour and product markets, and open trade and investment opportunities. In this context, 7 restrictions on freedoms of association and assembly, there are restrictions on the media and, in general, there is a lack of freedom of speech, and serious questions have arose with regard to the independence (or lack of independence) of the judiciary (see Freedom House 2014).
However, unlike the stereotype chaotic illiberal democracy Singapore is a well-ordered society with low crime rates and a lack of petty corruption. 6 It has a very high level of economic freedom; however, the government is quite active in taking specific economic initiatives.
The development of integrated resorts (resorts that include casinos) is an example of the Singaporean Government taking policy decisions so as to promote tourism (see MTI 2012).
The Government invited proposals for each development. The Heritage Foundation regards the labour market in Malta as being relatively rigid. 7 It is reasonable to contend that greater economic freedom would, to some degree, improve tourist services. However, overall, Malta offers an attractive combination of attributes to a large number of tourists; it has sun, sand and a rich and exotic history, and, it also offers the safety of good civil liberties.
Finally we turn to considering the case of Myanmar. We argue that this case is an exception in that, to some extent, lack of political rights has had a direct effect on the demand for tourism (see Henderson 2003, 104 Kyaw 2014) . For the past two decades the regime in Myanmar had wanted to grow the tourist industry, but it was only with the recent reforms that the tourist numbers dramatically jumped. These reforms caused improvements in political rights, civil liberties and economic freedom. Since the pre-reforms political repression in Myanmar had made it an international cause célèbre, in this special case the internationally recognized improvement in political rights clearly were significant in encouraging tourism.
Model, Data and Methodology
This section discusses the model, data and the methodology used in examining the impact of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism.
Model
The main purpose of this study is to explore the effects of political freedom and economic freedom on inbound tourism. In the first step, we examine the impact of political and economic freedom individually on inbound tourism via the following panel data model:
where IT is inbound tourism; X is either political freedom or economic freedom; Z represents a set of standard control variables discussed in the next section; θt allows for different years intercept (year effects); vi contains time-invariant effect (fixed country effects); eit is the error term; i is country; t is year. The parameter β is of interest as it measures the partial effect of political or economic freedom, holding Z fixed. We hypothesize that β is positive -that is, a high level of political or economic freedom increases international tourist numbers arriving in a country.
Secondly, we examine the moderation effects of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism. 8 The moderation effects of political and economic freedom (PF and EF, respectively) measures how PF and EF work together in shaping inbound tourism. Equation (2) incorporates the moderation effects in the base equation (1):
In equation (2), PF, EF and their interaction are considered at the same time. The marginal impacts of PF and EF on international tourist numbers are calculated as follows:
Clearly, the coefficient β3 captures the interaction effect of PF and EF. Given that β1, β2 > 0, if β3 > 0, equations 3(a) and 3(b) imply that the effect of PF (EF) on inbound tourism is greater as EF (PF) increases; conversely, if β3 < 0, the effect of PF (EF) is smaller as EF (PF) increases. We hypothesize that β3 < 0; that is, for example, increase in PF will be more (less)
influential at promoting inbound tourism as EF decreases (increases), and vice versa.
Data
This subsection discusses the variables used in the study and their data sources.
Dependent variables
We consider four different measures of inbound tourism -namely, tourism arrivals (TA), tourism arrivals per capita (TAPC), tourism receipts (TR), and tourism receipts per capita (TRPC). TA is the total number of international tourist arrivals (in thousands) to a country in a given year; TR is the total international tourism income (in million U.S. dollars) of a country in a given year; TAPC and TRPC are obtained using TA and TR divided by the country's population, respectively. The relevant data are extracted from the World Bank and Euromonitor International, covering over 110 countries from 1995 to 2012. 9 The number of countries selected for this study is based on the availability of data for most of the variables.
Independent variables
For the purpose of this study three different political freedom variables are used. First, we utilize Freedom House civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) data as political freedom variables. According to the definition provided by Freedom House, CL allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state and PR enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The scale for CL and PR is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 -a rating of 7 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 1 the lowest. 10 The third political freedom measure is democratic accountability (DA) which is obtained from the International
Country Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. It is a measure of how responsive government is to its citizens and it is more likely that less responsive governments will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one. 
Control variables
To ensure the model estimations are unbiased and reliable, a set of five variables are used as the control variables. They are (i) real gross domestic product per capita in logarithmic form (ln(GDPPC)) (ii) real exchange rate in the US dollar in logarithmic form (ln(EXCHR)) (iii) bureaucratic quality (BQ) (iv) external conflict (EC) (v) government stability (GS). 13 The literature on tourism destinations' competitiveness regards economic development as the crucial factor for strengthening human resources and infrastructure (see Das and Dirienzo 2009 However, it is important to note that this is not to be confused with demand models which use the source country's GDP as a proxy for income. Real exchange rate is a common control variable in tourism models (see Lim 2006 , Saha and Yap 2014 , and Cheung and Saha 2015 .
The real EXCHR measures the national currency prices in terms of US dollars that are adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP) over GDP. According to Lim 2006, EXCHR reflects the relative tourism prices between source and destination countries. When a destination's currency depreciates, the travel cost in the destination will be cheaper, and hence more international travelers are expected to visit the destination. To check for robustness the exchange rate and the inflation rate are considered (instead of the real exchange rate).
In addition, three more control variables -GS, EC and BQ -are used to distinguish the political stability of each destination. They are obtained from Political Risk Services (PRS)
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political instability indicators. 14 GS and EC are measured in a scale of 0 to 12 whereas, BQ is from 0 to 4 and a higher value of these indices represents more stable government, greater conflict and better quality, respectively. Since political stability plays an important role in determining destination choice, these three variables may have a considerable influence on tourism demand Yap and Saha 2013. The descriptive statistics of all the variables and pairwise correlations among independent and control variables under study are reported in appendix Table A1 and Table A2 , respectively.
Estimation Methodology
This paper applies panel data techniques to estimate the relationships between political/economic freedom and inbound tourism specified in equations (1) and (2).
According to Baltagi 2008 and Wooldridge 2009 , panel data models are advantageous over models with cross-sectional or time-series data because panel data allows researchers to control for time-invariant country heterogeneity that cannot be done when time-series or cross-sectional data are used. Not controlling this heterogeneity runs the risk of obtaining biased results (see Moulton 1986 and Moulton 1987) .
Two estimation techniques -namely, random effects (RE) estimation and fixed effects (FE) estimation -are routinely applied to panel data models. Between these two estimation techniques, the major advantage of FE over RE is that it avoids omitted variables bias owing to the probable correlation between the independent variables and the omitted variables, as long as the omitted variables are time-invariant (e.g. culture, location, historical heritage).
Since it is hard to rule out such bias a priori (for example, political/economic freedom and culture are very likely to be correlated), FE is the preferred estimation method in this study.
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It is important to note here that we are not trying to emphasize that culture is driven by The results from fixed (random) effects models may be affected by endogeneity problems.
For example, we assumed that economic development measured by real GDP per capita increases destinations' competitiveness and as a result increases the number of international tourists visiting a country. However, this positive relationship can be explained the other way around through tourism-led-growth. This form of endogeneity of explanatory variables is simultaneity. This arises when one or more of the explanatory variables are jointly determined with the dependent variable (see Wooldridge 2009 ). The endogeneity problem can be solved by applying instrumental variable methods such as generalized method of moments (GMM) (Gholipour et al. 2014) . For robustness purposes, following Arellano and
Bond 1991, we estimate GMM for endogeneity of GDPPC using the following external instruments: lagged saving (percentage of GDP), investment (percentage of GDP) and secondary school enrolment.
Empirical Results
This section discusses the empirical results of our analysis. The first part of the analysis focuses on the impacts of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism with control variables. The second part analyses the moderation effects of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism for all countries. The final part discusses the partial effects of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism. Both country and period fixed effects (i.e. twoway FE) are employed in all the analysis for the period 1995-2012.
To start with, the regression fit of the scatter plots shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 represents the relationship between civil liberties and economic freedom with tourist arrivals (TA). The log of tourist arrival per capita is measured on the Y-axis in both the figures and civil liberties (CL) and economic freedom (EF) are on the X-axes in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. The regression fit lines for civil liberties and economic freedom are upward sloping, indicating that civil liberties and economic freedom are positively correlated with tourist arrivals per capita. In other words, high civil liberties and economic freedom bring more international tourists to a country.
[FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
To explore the relationship in more detail we first start our analysis with tourist arrivals (TA) as the dependent variable based on equation (1) . The FE results for TA are reported in Table 1 . Columns (1)- (3) show the results for three different measures of the political freedom variable and their impact on TA. The coefficient for civil liberties (CL) in column (1) is positive and significant at the 5% level indicating that a higher level of civil liberties in a country would encourage more people to travel to that country from other countries. 17 Specifically, the regression result shows that when CL is up by one scale, holding other factors unchanged, tourist arrivals will increase by 7.39%. 18 On the other hand, while the effects of other political freedom measures such as democratic accountability (DA) and political rights (PR) are positive, none of them is significant (columns (2)- (3), Table 1 ). The result suggests that civil liberties are more crucial than other forms of political freedom in attracting foreign tourists. Likewise, Table 1 shows that the effect of economic freedom (EF)
is positive and significant, and a one scale rise in EF is associated with 9.85% increase in TA. 19 A similar effect is found with the other economic freedom measure (EFW) (column (5)). Tourist arrivals after controlling for country size (TAPC) produces very similar results shown in columns (6)- (10) (Table 1) . Overall, these results support our hypothesis that political (specifically, civil rights) and economic freedom would boost a country's inbound tourism. Besides, in Table 1 , while some of the control variables are statistically insignificant, they all show the expected signs. Real GDP per capita and depreciation of currency increases international tourists' arrivals as the coefficients of ln(GDPPC) and ln(EXCHR) are positive. 20 Countries with a low currency (a favourable exchange rate) attract more tourists.
In addition, political instability variables are all consistent and as expected with regard to their signs. A higher level of bureaucratic quality and government stability increases the inbound tourism for a country. On the other hand, external conflict has a negative and significant impact on inbound tourism, meaning that an increase in external conflict in a country decreases international travelers' demand for visiting such destinations. This is in line with previous studies on determinants of inbound tourism (e.g. Yap 2014 and Saha 2013) .
[ Table 2 reports the results when tourism revenue (TR) is the dependent variable (columns (1)- (5)). The coefficients for political and economic freedom variables retain the similar signs and significance level for political and economic freedom in terms of tourism revenue.
However, the magnitudes of the CL and EF coefficients are greater for TR, i.e. a one unit increase in CL and EF increases TR by 9.69% and 12.3%, respectively. Interestingly, DA is significant when TR is the dependent variable. The impact on tourism revenue per capita (TRPC) again illustrates similar results in columns (6)-(10) ( Table 2 ). Overall, both civil liberties and economic freedoms consistently show positive influence in increasing tourism demand for a country. These two variables, plus the control factors, explain more than 50% of the variations in inbound tourism across countries.
[ 
Moderation Effects of Political and Economic Freedom on Inbound Tourism
This subsection discusses the results of the moderation effects of political and economic freedom on inbound tourism based on equation (2). The above results confirm that among the three measures of political freedom, only civil liberties (CL) consistently show positive and significant impacts on inbound tourism along with both measures of economic freedom (EF and EFW). Hence, the focus of the moderation effect is the interaction term between CL and EF/EFW and its influence on inbound tourism. To save space, we only report the estimation results with the interaction between CL and EF. 21 The fixed effects estimation results for tourism arrival and tourism revenue are reported in Table 3 .
In columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3 Tables   1 and 2 . However, this linear setting is unable to incorporate the moderation effect. In columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) on the other hand, the effect of EF is positive only if CL is lower than 0.408/0.095=4.29 (e.g.
Israel and Greece). In other words, the effect of CL (EF) is the highest when EF (CL) is low.
Accordingly, the negative interaction effect of CL and EF might ultimately make any increase of CL and/or EF damage inbound tourism when EF and CL are already at high levels.
To examine the robustness of our results we run through various model specifications; the results are not reported here due to space limitations. 22 The non-linear effects of CL and EF
on inbound tourism are also tested by adding the square terms of CL and EF and the moderation effects results remain the same even after including the square terms in the model specification. 23 It is important to note that the moderation effects between CL and EF remain the same sign and significant even after excluding the real GDP per capita which may cause the endogeneity problem. 24 Moreover, incorporating HDI as a different measure of economic development and inflation does not alter our main finding regarding the moderation effect of CL and EF. 25 Finally, GMM results after controlling for endogeneity of real GDP per capita confirm the moderation effect results discussed above.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We further explore the partial effects of CL (EF) on tourism demand at various levels of EF (CL) and report the results in Table 4 (5). 27 In Table 4 , CL significantly increases inbound tourism, but in a diminishing manner till EF reaches between 6 and 7. When EF ≥ 7, the effect of CL is no longer positive and becomes insignificant. Likewise, as shown in Table 5 , the partial effect of EF decreases as CL increases and the effect is no longer positive and significant when CL ≥ 4.
[ TABLE 4 AND TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Conclusion
In this article, we examined the influence of political and economic freedom on the performance of the tourism industry, in terms of tourist arrivals and tourism receipts, for over 110 countries for the period 1995-2012, by using panel data estimation techniques. The results show that political freedom has a favourable effect on inbound tourism, however, among the three political freedom measures considered, only civil liberties show consistent and significant positive impacts on tourism (and the magnitude of the effect is considerable).
By facilitating personal freedom and safety from arbitrary persecution, civil liberties are able 20 to attract more international tourists into a country. After using several indicators and specifications, this effect was shown to be robust. Likewise, economic freedom enhances tourism for all measures of inbound tourism. The results show similar effects for alternative economic freedom measures. This result is consistent with economic theory which predicts the removal of restrictions will reduce rent-seeking behaviour and facilitate an improvement in services as individuals respond to incentives. Hence, more freedom expands a country's tourism industry. The results for control variables are also consistent with the theory; that is, a higher real GDP per capita and a currency depreciation encourage more tourists to visit a country. In addition, a higher level of bureaucratic quality, government stability and less external conflict increase the number of tourists and the revenue from the tourism industry.
The moderation effect results reveal that civil liberties (economic freedom) produce positive effects on inbound tourism at the mean score of economic freedom (civil liberties); however, the effects decrease when economic freedom (civil liberties) is high. In other words, the effect of CL (EF) is the highest when EF (CL) is low. The partial interaction effects of civil liberties and economic freedom provide interesting insights to identify the impact on inbound tourism at various levels of freedom. In comparison, civil liberties significantly increase inbound tourism up to the economic freedom index between 6 and 7 and after the threshold level the effect is no longer positive. On the other hand, the threshold level of economic freedom is between 3 and 4 of the civil liberties index and after that level the effect of economic freedom decreases when the value of the civil liberties index increases. The moderation effects suggest that any type of freedom either political or economic freedom can cause a strengthening in the inbound tourism.
The policy implications of our results need to be considered with the proviso that policy makers cannot simply 'pull a lever' and instantly have improved levels of civil liberties and/or economic freedom. With civil liberties reforms, these are unlikely to be primarily, or even significantly, motivated by the desire to improve inbound tourism. Civil liberties reforms will only be fully effective over quite a period of time. For example, consider institutional reforms that, in a legal sense, make the judiciary fully independent. Here it may take decades for some judicial attitudes to change. That is, some judges may retain the mindset associated with the illiberal state, for example, believing it is right, proper and patriotic to always believe the police and take direction from the government. While economic reforms can have a rapid effect as entrepreneurs take advantages of new opportunities, gaining sufficient political consensus to implement such reforms may well be a time consuming process. Nevertheless it is plausible to contend that in many cases economic reform will have more of a comparatively short run impact than reforms to enhance civil liberties. In such a situation, a reformist government, motivated by the desire to facilitate economic growth and heal social divisions, may act to put in place reforms to establish improvements in economic and political freedom, and, expect benefits from increased tourism demand in the shorter run (because of increased economic freedom) and in the longer run (because of improved civil liberties). Notes: (i) Regression results are based on equation (1), using both year and country fixed effects; (ii) ln(*) stands for natural log; (iii) dependent variables: TA -tourism arrivals; TAPC -tourism arrivals per capita; (iv) independent variable: GDPPC -real GDP per capita; EXCHR -real exchange rate; others are as the names shown; and (v) 23. Overall, adding the square terms of CL and EF does not show significant improvement of the modelling result in terms of the adjusted Rsquare (comparing to Table 3 ).
24. The main finding regarding the effects of CL and EF to inbound tourism is essentially the same regardless of including GDP as a control or not. 41 25. The estimated coefficients of human development index (HDI), exchange rate change and inflation are all significant and with the expected signs: positive for HDI and exchange rate change and negative for inflation. This is in line with better quality (higher HDI) and lower cost (higher exchange rate change (depreciation) and lower Inflation) which attract more inbound tourism.
26. In GMM estimation, ln(GDPPC) is treated as an endogenous variable and instrumented with lagged saving (per capita), investment (percentage of GDP) and secondary school enrolment. In all cases, the existence of serial correlations is tested using AR tests and the results confirm no sign of autocorrelation (at the 5% level). Moreover, The Hansen test shows that the exogeneity hypothesis (of instruments) cannot be rejected at the 5% level. where µ1 and µ2 take values from minimum to maximum values of the political and economic freedom indices, respectively. The coefficient β1 measures the partial effect of civil liberties when μ2 takes the value from minimum to maximum values for the economic freedom index. A similar interpretation applies to coefficient β2 as that for β1.
